Audit OpenClaw Security

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name: audit-openclaw-security description: Audit and harden OpenClaw deployments and interpret openclaw security audit findings. Use when the user wants to secure OpenClaw, review gateway exposure/auth/reverse proxies/Tailscale Serve or Funnel, check DM/group access (pairing, allowlists, mention gating, session.dmScope), minimise tool permissions and sandboxing, review plugins/skills/secrets/transcripts/log retention, or lock down Docker/macOS/laptop/EC2 installs. Not for generic OS, Docker, or cloud hardening unrelated to OpenClaw. license: MIT compatibility: Best with local shell access (Claude Code, OpenClaw desktop/CLI, or a similar agent runtime). In chat-only environments, ask the user to run the bundled commands locally and share redacted outputs. metadata: {"author":"community","version":"2.1.0","validated_for":"2026.3.8","upstream":"OpenClaw docs + Agent Skills guidance (validated 2026-03-11)"}

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audit-openclaw-security

Run a defensive, permissioned security audit of an OpenClaw deployment and turn the results into a practical remediation plan.

This revision is tuned for OpenClaw 2026.3.8 and uses {baseDir} when referencing bundled scripts from commands.

Guardrails

1. Only audit systems the user owns or has explicit permission to assess. 2. Never ask for raw secrets. Do not request gateway tokens/passwords, model API keys, session cookies, OAuth creds, or raw credential files. 3. Prefer outputs that are designed to be shareable or redacted: - openclaw status --all - openclaw status --deep - openclaw gateway probe --json - openclaw security audit --json - openclaw security audit --deep --json 4. Treat the Gateway, Control UI, browser control, paired nodes, and automation surfaces as operator-level access. 5. Default to audit-only. Before any config edits, --fix operations, firewall changes, or restarts, create a backup first and get explicit user approval. 6. When the user wants remediation, make the backup step explicit: - openclaw backup create --verify - use --no-include-workspace if the config is invalid but you still need state + creds - use --only-config if the user only wants a minimal safety copy before edits

What “good” looks like

Gateway is bound to loopback unless there is a deliberate, defended reason not to.

Strong Gateway auth is enabled.

No accidental public exposure (LAN bind, port-forward, permissive reverse proxy, Tailscale Funnel).

Control UI is either localhost/Serve or explicitly origin-restricted behind a trusted proxy.

DMs require pairing or strict allowlists.

Groups require mention gating and are not open if broad tools are enabled.

session.dmScope is isolated appropriately:

- per-channel-peer for most multi-user setups - per-account-channel-peer when the same provider runs multiple accounts

Tooling is least privilege:

- tools.profile: "messaging" or stricter for inbox-facing agents - deny group:runtime, group:fs, group:automation on untrusted surfaces - tools.fs.workspaceOnly: true - tools.exec.security: "deny" or at least approval-gated - tools.elevated.enabled: false unless there is a narrow, intentional need

Plugins and skills are explicitly trusted, minimally writable, and not used as an easy persistence path.

Secrets, transcripts, and logs have tight permissions and an intentional retention plan.

Use the bundled files progressively

Only open the extra files you need for the task:

references/command-cheatsheet.md — exact command ladders

references/openclaw-audit-checks.md — current high-signal checkId glossary

references/openclaw-baseline-config.md — secure baseline snippets

references/platform-mac-mini.md

references/platform-personal-laptop.md

references/platform-docker.md

references/platform-aws-ec2.md

assets/report-template.md — report structure

Step 0 — Establish context quickly

Collect just enough context to choose the audit path:

Where is OpenClaw running?

- macOS host / Mac mini - personal laptop - Docker host - EC2 / VPS / other cloud VM

Install style?

- native install - Docker / Compose - source checkout

Do we have local shell access?

- Mode A: chat-only / user runs commands - Mode B: agent can run shell commands directly

Mode A — Assisted self-audit (chat-only)

Ask the user to run the following on the OpenClaw host and share the outputs.

Minimum audit set

openclaw --version
openclaw status --all
openclaw status --deep
openclaw gateway status
openclaw gateway probe --json
openclaw channels status --probe
openclaw doctor
openclaw security audit --json
openclaw security audit --deep --json

Helpful extras

openclaw health --json
openclaw backup create --dry-run --json
openclaw backup create --only-config --dry-run --json
openclaw skills list --eligible --json
openclaw plugins list --json

Safe targeted config reads

Prefer targeted reads over a full config dump:

openclaw config get gateway.bind
openclaw config get gateway.auth.mode
openclaw config get gateway.auth.allowTailscale
openclaw config get gateway.controlUi.allowedOrigins
openclaw config get gateway.trustedProxies
openclaw config get gateway.allowRealIpFallback
openclaw config get discovery.mdns.mode
openclaw config get session.dmScope
openclaw config get tools.profile
openclaw config get tools.fs.workspaceOnly
openclaw config get tools.exec.security
openclaw config get tools.elevated.enabled
openclaw config get channels.defaults.dmPolicy
openclaw config get channels.defaults.groupPolicy
openclaw config get logging.redactSensitive

DM / group follow-up checks

If the issue is “the bot is online but DMs or groups behave strangely”, check pairing and mention gating:

openclaw pairing list 

Examples of include discord, slack, signal, telegram, whatsapp, matrix, imessage, and bluebubbles.

If the user must share the config

OpenClaw config is often JSON5-like. Redact it before sharing:

python3 "{baseDir}/scripts/redact_openclaw_config.py" ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json > openclaw.json.redacted

Host / network snapshots

macOS

whoami
sw_vers
uname -a
lsof -nP -iTCP -sTCP:LISTEN
/usr/libexec/ApplicationFirewall/socketfilterfw --getglobalstate
/usr/libexec/ApplicationFirewall/socketfilterfw --getstealthmode
fdesetup status || true

Linux / cloud VM

whoami
cat /etc/os-release
uname -a
ss -ltnp
sudo ufw status verbose || true
sudo nft list ruleset || true
sudo iptables -S || true

Docker / Compose

docker ps --format 'table {{.Names}}	{{.Image}}	{{.Ports}}'
docker compose ps || true
docker port openclaw-gateway 18789 || true

Mode B — Automated local audit (shell access)

Run the bundled collector and report renderer:

bash "{baseDir}/scripts/collect_openclaw_audit.sh" --out ./openclaw-audit
python3 "{baseDir}/scripts/render_report.py" --input ./openclaw-audit --output ./openclaw-security-report.md

Then review openclaw-security-report.md, refine wording where needed, and present the final report to the user.

Notes on the collector

It is read-only by default.

It does not run openclaw security audit --fix.

It collects shareable CLI diagnostics plus basic host/network context.

It now captures current high-value signals such as:

- openclaw status --deep - openclaw gateway probe --json - openclaw channels status --probe - targeted safe config get values - backup dry-run metadata

How to interpret the audit

Use OpenClaw’s own security audit output as the primary source of truth, then translate it into a clear threat narrative.

Triage order

Prioritise in this order:

1. Anything open + tools enabled Lock down DMs/groups first, then tighten tool policy and sandboxing. 2. Public network exposure LAN bind, Funnel, missing auth, weak reverse-proxy handling. 3. Browser / node / Control UI exposure Treat these as operator access, not “just another feature”. 4. Filesystem permissions State dir, config file, auth profiles, logs, and transcript locations. 5. Plugin / skill supply chain Trust only what is intentionally installed and writable by the right user. 6. Model and prompt-injection resilience Important, but not a substitute for access control.

Findings that are easy to miss in newer OpenClaw builds

Pay extra attention to these newer or high-signal check IDs:

gateway.control_ui.allowed_origins_required

gateway.control_ui.host_header_origin_fallback

gateway.real_ip_fallback_enabled

config.insecure_or_dangerous_flags

sandbox.dangerous_network_mode

tools.exec.host_sandbox_no_sandbox_defaults

tools.exec.host_sandbox_no_sandbox_agents

tools.exec.safe_bins_interpreter_unprofiled

skills.workspace.symlink_escape

security.exposure.open_groups_with_elevated

security.exposure.open_groups_with_runtime_or_fs

security.trust_model.multi_user_heuristic

Use references/openclaw-audit-checks.md and assets/openclaw_checkid_map.json to map each finding to likely config paths and remediation areas.

Core remediation patterns

1) Gateway exposure and auth

Prefer gateway.bind: "loopback".

Require token or password auth for anything beyond strictly local use.

Do not treat gateway.remote.* values as protection for local WS access; actual protection comes from gateway.auth.*.

If the user needs a new shared secret, openclaw doctor --generate-gateway-token is the safe boring path.

2) Reverse proxies and browser-origin policy

If there is a reverse proxy in front of the Gateway:

configure gateway.trustedProxies

keep gateway.allowRealIpFallback: false unless there is a very specific need

for non-loopback Control UI use, set gateway.controlUi.allowedOrigins

do not enable Host-header origin fallback unless the user knowingly accepts the downgrade

3) Tailscale Serve vs Funnel

tailscale.mode: "serve" keeps the Gateway tailnet-only.

tailscale.mode: "funnel" is public and should be treated as urgent/high risk.

gateway.auth.allowTailscale can allow tokenless Control UI/WebSocket auth via Tailscale identity headers. That assumes the gateway host itself is trusted.

If untrusted code can run on the host, or if any reverse proxy sits in front of the gateway, disable gateway.auth.allowTailscale and require token/password or trusted-proxy auth.

4) DM and group isolation

Use dmPolicy: "pairing" or allowlist for inbox-facing bots.

For shared or support-style inboxes, set session.dmScope: "per-channel-peer".

For multi-account channel setups, prefer per-account-channel-peer.

Avoid groupPolicy: "open" unless the tool surface is extremely limited.

Require mentions in groups and use agents.list[].groupChat.mentionPatterns where native mentions are unreliable.

5) Tool surface reduction

Start from the conservative baseline in references/openclaw-baseline-config.md.

Good defaults for user-facing agents:

tools.profile: "messaging"

deny group:automation

deny group:runtime

deny group:fs

tools.fs.workspaceOnly: true

tools.exec.security: "deny" and ask: "always"

tools.exec.applyPatch.workspaceOnly: true

tools.elevated.enabled: false

6) Node / browser / automation trust

Paired nodes are remote execution surfaces. Audit them like you would audit operator access.

Browser control is not “just viewing pages”; it is effectively remote operator capability.

gateway / cron tools create persistence and should not be reachable from untrusted chat surfaces.

7) Secrets, logs, transcripts, and writable paths

Audit and discuss these paths carefully without asking for raw contents:

~/.openclaw/openclaw.json

~/.openclaw/secrets.json

~/.openclaw/agents//agent/auth-profiles.json

~/.openclaw/agents//sessions/*.jsonl

/tmp/openclaw/openclaw-YYYY-MM-DD.log

pairing stores under ~/.openclaw/credentials/

Platform-specific guidance

Load the matching playbook when the environment is clear:

macOS host / Mac mini -> references/platform-mac-mini.md

personal laptop -> references/platform-personal-laptop.md

Docker / Compose -> references/platform-docker.md

EC2 / VPS -> references/platform-aws-ec2.md

Deliverable format

Use assets/report-template.md or the rendered report from {baseDir}/scripts/render_report.py.

The final deliverable should include:

executive summary

environment overview

findings table with redacted evidence

sequenced remediation plan

verification commands

residual risk / operational practices

Troubleshooting notes

“openclaw: command not found”

Confirm the CLI is installed and on PATH.

On Windows, prefer WSL2 for shell-driven audit flows.

Re-run the official install / update path, then retry openclaw --version.

“Gateway won’t start — configuration invalid”

OpenClaw now fails closed on invalid config keys, invalid values, or invalid types. That is intentional and security-relevant.

Use:

openclaw doctor
openclaw doctor --fix

Even when the config is invalid, diagnostic commands such as openclaw status, openclaw gateway status, openclaw gateway probe, and openclaw health are still useful.

“Runtime: running” but “RPC probe: failed”

Trust the probe details, not just the supervisor status:

Probe target

Listening

Last gateway error

This often means service/config drift, auth mismatch, or a listener that is not actually reachable by the CLI.

“Bot is online but DMs fail”

Check:

openclaw channels status --probe
openclaw pairing list 

Common root causes:

pending pairing approval

dmPolicy too strict for the expected sender

provider-side permission or token drift

“Groups are silent”

Check:

groupPolicy

requireMention

mentionPatterns

audit findings about open groups combined with runtime/fs/elevated tools

Trigger tests (skill author sanity check)

Should trigger:

“Can you audit my OpenClaw setup for security?”

“My OpenClaw gateway is exposed through Tailscale Serve — is that okay?”

“Interpret my openclaw security audit --deep --json findings.”

“I’m running OpenClaw in Docker on a VPS; help me harden it.”

“Why is my OpenClaw Control UI complaining about origins and trusted proxies?”

“My bot is online but DMs don’t reply; can you audit pairing and access policy?”

Should not trigger:

generic macOS hardening unrelated to OpenClaw

generic Docker security unrelated to OpenClaw

general AWS or VPS hardening unrelated to OpenClaw

unrelated software audits