Audit Trail

---

name: audit-trail description: "Governance — immutable, timestamped, hash-chained audit log of all agent actions. Forensic-ready for compliance, investigation, and accountability." metadata: {"openclaw":{"emoji":"📜","category":"governance"}}

---

Audit Trail — Immutable Action Log

Purpose

Provide a tamper-evident, complete record of every agent action for forensic investigation, compliance auditing, and accountability.

Integration

Always-on hook on ALL agent actions:

Tool use (exec, file read/write, network)

Skill invocations

Channel messages (in/out)

Memory reads/writes

Configuration changes

Error events

Log Format (JSONL, append-only)

{"id":"ACT-20260331-000001","ts":"2026-03-31T14:30:00.123Z","agent":"openclaw-main","session":"sess_abc123","type":"tool_use","tool":"exec","args":{"cmd":"npm test"},"skill":"contract-tester","channel":"telegram","user_hash":"sha256:a1b2c3...","outcome":"success","duration_ms":4200,"prev_hash":"sha256:000000","hash":"sha256:d4e5f6..."}

Fields

| Field | Type | Description | |-------|------|-------------| | id | string | Unique sequential ID | | ts | ISO 8601 | Microsecond timestamp | | agent | string | Agent identifier | | session | string | Session ID | | type | enum | tool_use, skill_invoke, channel_in, channel_out, memory_write, config_change, error | | tool | string | Tool name (if applicable) | | args | object | Sanitized arguments (secrets redacted) | | skill | string | Invoking skill | | channel | string | Source channel | | user_hash | string | SHA-256 of user identifier (never raw) | | outcome | enum | success, failure, timeout, blocked | | duration_ms | number | Execution time | | prev_hash | string | SHA-256 of previous log entry (chain) | | hash | string | SHA-256 of this entry (including prev_hash) |

Storage

.security/audit-trail/
├── 2026-03-31.jsonl        (today, active)
├── 2026-03-30.jsonl        (yesterday)
├── 2026-03-29.jsonl.gz     (compressed, >7 days)
└── integrity-check.log     (chain verification results)

Integrity Verification

Each entry's hash = SHA-256(id + ts + type + tool + outcome + prev_hash)

Chain validation: entry[n].prev_hash == entry[n-1].hash

Run verification: jq -r '.hash' | sha256sum --check

Tampering detection: broken chain → CRITICAL alert

Retention Policy

| Age | Storage | Access | |-----|---------|--------| | 0-7 days | Raw JSONL | Direct read | | 7-90 days | Compressed JSONL.gz | Decompress on query | | 90-365 days | Archive (if configured) | Restore on request | | >365 days | Purge (manual only, human approval) | — |

Query Examples

# All actions by a specific skill
jq 'select(.skill=="contract-tester")' .security/audit-trail/2026-03-31.jsonl
All failures
jq 'select(.outcome=="failure")' .security/audit-trail/*.jsonl
Actions in a time window
jq 'select(.ts >= "2026-03-31T14:00" and .ts < "2026-03-31T15:00")' .security/audit-trail/2026-03-31.jsonl
Channel activity summary
jq -s 'group_by(.channel) | map({channel: .[0].channel, count: length})' .security/audit-trail/2026-03-31.jsonl

Guardrails

Log file is APPEND-ONLY — agent cannot delete or modify entries

Secrets in arguments are redacted BEFORE logging (using agent-firewall patterns)

User identifiers are hashed, never stored in plaintext

Log integrity verified on every read

Manual purge requires human approval + logged as audit action itself