Clawdbot Security Check

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name: clawdbot-self-security-audit description: Perform a comprehensive read-only security audit of Clawdbot's own configuration. This is a knowledge-based skill that teaches Clawdbot to identify hardening opportunities across the system. Use when user asks to "run security check", "audit clawdbot", "check security hardening", or "what vulnerabilities does my Clawdbot have". This skill uses Clawdbot's internal capabilities and file system access to inspect configuration, detect misconfigurations, and recommend remediations. It is designed to be extensible - new checks can be added by updating this skill's knowledge. homepage: https://github.com/TheSethRose/Clawdbot-Security-Check metadata: {"clawdbot":{"emoji":"🔒","os":["darwin","linux"],"requires":{"files":["read"],"tools":["exec","bash"]},"install":[{"id":"read-skill","kind":"skill","name":"clawdbot-self-security-audit","label":"Install security audit skill","bins":["SKILL.md"]}]}}

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Clawdbot Self-Security Audit Framework

This skill empowers Clawdbot to audit its own security posture using first-principles reasoning. Rather than relying on a static script, Clawdbot learns the framework and applies it dynamically to detect vulnerabilities, understand their impact, and recommend specific remediations.

Core Philosophy

> "Security through transparency and self-awareness." — Inspired by ᴅᴀɴɪᴇʟ ᴍɪᴇssʟᴇʀ

Clawdbot should know its own attack surface. This skill embeds that knowledge directly.

Security Principles

Running an AI agent with shell access requires caution. Focus on three areas:

1. Who can talk to the bot — DM policies, group allowlists, channel restrictions 2. Where the bot is allowed to act — Network exposure, gateway binding, proxy configs 3. What the bot can touch — Tool access, file permissions, credential storage

Start with the smallest access possible and widen it as you gain confidence.

Trust Hierarchy

Apply appropriate trust levels based on role:

| Level | Entity | Trust Model | |-------|--------|-------------| | 1 | Owner | Full trust — has all access | | 2 | AI | Trust but verify — sandboxed, logged | | 3 | Allowlists | Limited trust — only specified users | | 4 | Strangers | No trust — blocked by default |

Audit Commands

Use these commands to run security audits:

clawdbot security audit — Standard audit of common issues

clawdbot security audit --deep — Comprehensive audit with all checks

clawdbot security audit --fix — Apply guardrail remediations

The 12 Security Domains

When auditing Clawdbot, systematically evaluate these domains:

1. Gateway Exposure 🔴 Critical

What to check:

Where is the gateway binding? (gateway.bind)

Is authentication configured? (gateway.auth_token or CLAWDBOT_GATEWAY_TOKEN env var)

What port is exposed? (default: 18789)

Is WebSocket auth enabled?

How to detect:

cat ~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json | grep -A10 '"gateway"'
env | grep CLAWDBOT_GATEWAY_TOKEN

Vulnerability: Binding to 0.0.0.0 or lan without auth allows network access.

Remediation:

# Generate gateway token
clawdbot doctor --generate-gateway-token
export CLAWDBOT_GATEWAY_TOKEN="$(openssl rand -hex 32)"

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2. DM Policy Configuration 🟠 High

What to check:

What is dm_policy set to?

If allowlist, who is explicitly allowed via allowFrom?

How to detect:

cat ~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json | grep -E '"dm_policy|"allowFrom"'

Vulnerability: Setting to allow or open means any user can DM Clawdbot.

Remediation:

{
  "channels": {
    "telegram": {
      "dmPolicy": "allowlist",
      "allowFrom": ["@trusteduser1", "@trusteduser2"]
    }
  }
}

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3. Group Access Control 🟠 High

What to check:

What is groupPolicy set to?

Are groups explicitly allowlisted?

Are mention gates configured?

How to detect:

cat ~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json | grep -E '"groupPolicy"|"groups"' 
cat ~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json | grep -i "mention"

Vulnerability: Open group policy allows anyone in the room to trigger commands.

Remediation:

{
  "channels": {
    "telegram": {
      "groupPolicy": "allowlist",
      "groups": {
        "-100123456789": true
      }
    }
  }
}

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4. Credentials Security 🔴 Critical

What to check:

Credential file locations and permissions

Environment variable usage

Auth profile storage

Credential Storage Map: | Platform | Path | |----------|------| | WhatsApp | ~/.clawdbot/credentials/whatsapp/{accountId}/creds.json | | Telegram | ~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json or env | | Discord | ~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json or env | | Slack | ~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json or env | | Pairing allowlists | ~/.clawdbot/credentials/channel-allowFrom.json | | Auth profiles | ~/.clawdbot/agents/{agentId}/auth-profiles.json | | Legacy OAuth | ~/.clawdbot/credentials/oauth.json |

How to detect:

ls -la ~/.clawdbot/credentials/
ls -la ~/.clawdbot/agents/*/auth-profiles.json 2>/dev/null
stat -c "%a" ~/.clawdbot/credentials/oauth.json 2>/dev/null

Vulnerability: Plaintext credentials with loose permissions can be read by any process.

Remediation:

chmod 700 ~/.clawdbot
chmod 600 ~/.clawdbot/credentials/oauth.json
chmod 600 ~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json

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5. Browser Control Exposure 🟠 High

What to check:

Is browser control enabled?

Are authentication tokens set for remote control?

Is HTTPS required for Control UI?

Is a dedicated browser profile configured?

How to detect:

cat ~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json | grep -A5 '"browser"'
cat ~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json | grep -i "controlUi|insecureAuth"
ls -la ~/.clawdbot/browser/

Vulnerability: Exposed browser control without auth allows remote UI takeover. Browser access allows the model to use logged-in sessions.

Remediation:

{
  "browser": {
    "remoteControlUrl": "https://...",
    "remoteControlToken": "...",
    "dedicatedProfile": true,
    "disableHostControl": true
  },
  "gateway": {
    "controlUi": {
      "allowInsecureAuth": false
    }
  }
}

Security Note: Treat browser control URLs as admin APIs.

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6. Gateway Bind & Network Exposure 🟠 High

What to check:

What is gateway.bind set to?

Are trusted proxies configured?

Is Tailscale enabled?

How to detect:

cat ~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json | grep -A10 '"gateway"'
cat ~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json | grep '"tailscale"'

Vulnerability: Public binding without auth allows internet access to gateway.

Remediation:

{
  "gateway": {
    "bind": "127.0.0.1",
    "mode": "local",
    "trustedProxies": ["127.0.0.1", "10.0.0.0/8"],
    "tailscale": {
      "mode": "off"
    }
  }
}

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7. Tool Access & Sandboxing 🟡 Medium

What to check:

Are elevated tools allowlisted?

Is restrict_tools or mcp_tools configured?

What is workspaceAccess set to?

Are sensitive tools running in sandbox?

How to detect:

cat ~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json | grep -i "restrict|mcp|elevated"
cat ~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json | grep -i "workspaceAccess|sandbox"
cat ~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json | grep -i "openRoom"

Workspace Access Levels: | Mode | Description | |------|-------------| | none | Workspace is off limits | | ro | Workspace mounted read-only | | rw | Workspace mounted read-write |

Vulnerability: Broad tool access means more blast radius if compromised. Smaller models are more susceptible to tool misuse.

Remediation:

{
  "restrict_tools": true,
  "mcp_tools": {
    "allowed": ["read", "write", "bash"],
    "blocked": ["exec", "gateway"]
  },
  "workspaceAccess": "ro",
  "sandbox": "all"
}

Model Guidance: Use latest generation models for agents with filesystem or network access. If using small models, disable web search and browser tools.

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8. File Permissions & Local Disk Hygiene 🟡 Medium

What to check:

Directory permissions (should be 700)

Config file permissions (should be 600)

Symlink safety

How to detect:

stat -c "%a" ~/.clawdbot
ls -la ~/.clawdbot/*.json

Vulnerability: Loose permissions allow other users to read sensitive configs.

Remediation:

chmod 700 ~/.clawdbot
chmod 600 ~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json
chmod 600 ~/.clawdbot/credentials/*

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9. Plugin Trust & Model Hygiene 🟡 Medium

What to check:

Are plugins explicitly allowlisted?

Are legacy models in use with tool access?

How to detect:

cat ~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json | grep -i "plugin|allowlist"
cat ~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json | grep -i "model|anthropic"

Vulnerability: Untrusted plugins can execute code. Legacy models may lack modern safety.

Remediation:

{
  "plugins": {
    "allowlist": ["trusted-plugin-1", "trusted-plugin-2"]
  },
  "agents": {
    "defaults": {
      "model": {
        "primary": "minimax/MiniMax-M2.1"
      }
    }
  }
}

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10. Logging & Redaction 🟡 Medium

What is logging.redactSensitive set to?

Should be tools to redact sensitive tool output

If off, credentials may leak in logs

How to detect:

cat ~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json | grep -i "logging|redact"
ls -la ~/.clawdbot/logs/

Remediation:

{
  "logging": {
    "redactSensitive": "tools",
    "path": "~/.clawdbot/logs/"
  }
}

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11. Prompt Injection Protection 🟡 Medium

What to check:

Is wrap_untrusted_content or untrusted_content_wrapper enabled?

How is external/web content handled?

Are links and attachments treated as hostile?

How to detect:

cat ~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json | grep -i "untrusted|wrap"

Prompt Injection Mitigation Strategies:

Keep DMs locked to pairing or allowlists

Use mention gating in groups

Treat all links and attachments as hostile

Run sensitive tools in a sandbox

Use instruction-hardened models like Anthropic Opus 4.5

Vulnerability: Untrusted content (web fetches, sandbox output) can inject malicious prompts.

Remediation:

{
  "wrap_untrusted_content": true,
  "untrusted_content_wrapper": "",
  "treatLinksAsHostile": true,
  "mentionGate": true
}

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12. Dangerous Command Blocking 🟡 Medium

What to check:

What commands are in blocked_commands?

Are these patterns included: rm -rf, curl |, git push --force, mkfs, fork bombs?

How to detect:

cat ~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json | grep -A10 '"blocked_commands"'

Vulnerability: Without blocking, a malicious prompt could destroy data or exfiltrate credentials.

Remediation:

{
  "blocked_commands": [
    "rm -rf",
    "curl |",
    "git push --force",
    "mkfs",
    ":(){:|:&}"
  ]
}

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13. Secret Scanning Readiness 🟡 Medium

What to check:

Is detect-secrets configured?

Is there a .secrets.baseline file?

Has a baseline scan been run?

How to detect:

ls -la .secrets.baseline 2>/dev/null
which detect-secrets 2>/dev/null

Secret Scanning (CI):

# Find candidates
detect-secrets scan --baseline .secrets.baseline
Review findings
detect-secrets audit
Update baseline after rotating secrets or marking false positives
detect-secrets scan --baseline .secrets.baseline --update

Vulnerability: Leaked credentials in the codebase can lead to compromise.

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Audit Functions

The --fix flag applies these guardrails:

Changes groupPolicy from open to allowlist for common channels

Resets logging.redactSensitive from off to tools

Tightens local permissions: .clawdbot directory to 700, config files to 600

Secures state files including credentials and auth profiles

High-Level Audit Checklist

Treat findings in this priority order:

1. 🔴 Lock down DMs and groups if tools are enabled on open settings 2. 🔴 Fix public network exposure immediately 3. 🟠 Secure browser control with tokens and HTTPS 4. 🟠 Correct file permissions for credentials and config 5. 🟡 Only load trusted plugins 6. 🟡 Use modern models for bots with tool access

Access Control Models

DM Access Model

| Mode | Description | |------|-------------| | pairing | Default - unknown senders must be approved via code | | allowlist | Unknown senders blocked without handshake | | open | Public access - requires explicit asterisk in allowlist | | disabled | All inbound DMs ignored |

Slash Commands

Slash commands are only available to authorized senders based on channel allowlists. The /exec command is a session convenience for operators and does not modify global config.

Threat Model & Mitigation

Potential Risks

| Risk | Mitigation | |------|------------| | Execution of shell commands | blocked_commands, restrict_tools | | File and network access | sandbox, workspaceAccess: none/ro | | Social engineering and prompt injection | wrap_untrusted_content, mentionGate | | Browser session hijacking | Dedicated profile, token auth, HTTPS | | Credential leakage | logging.redactSensitive: tools, env vars |

Incident Response

If a compromise is suspected, follow these steps:

Containment

1. Stop the gateway process — clawdbot daemon stop 2. Set gateway.bind to loopback — "bind": "127.0.0.1" 3. Disable risky DMs and groups — Set to disabled

Rotation

1. Change the gateway auth token — clawdbot doctor --generate-gateway-token 2. Rotate browser control and hook tokens 3. Revoke and rotate API keys for model providers

Review

1. Check gateway logs and session transcripts — ~/.clawdbot/logs/ 2. Review recent config changes — Git history or backups 3. Re-run the security audit with the deep flag — clawdbot security audit --deep

Reporting Vulnerabilities

Report security issues to: security@clawd.bot

Do not post vulnerabilities publicly until they have been fixed.

Audit Execution Steps

When running a security audit, follow this sequence:

Step 1: Locate Configuration

CONFIG_PATHS=(
  "$HOME/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json"
  "$HOME/.clawdbot/config.yaml"
  "$HOME/.clawdbot/.clawdbotrc"
  ".clawdbotrc"
)
for path in "${CONFIG_PATHS[@]}"; do
  if [ -f "$path" ]; then
    echo "Found config: $path"
    cat "$path"
    break
  fi
done

Step 2: Run Domain Checks

For each of the 13 domains above: 1. Parse relevant config keys 2. Compare against secure baseline 3. Flag deviations with severity

Step 3: Generate Report

Format findings by severity:

🔴 CRITICAL: [vulnerability] - [impact]
🟠 HIGH: [vulnerability] - [impact]
🟡 MEDIUM: [vulnerability] - [impact]
✅ PASSED: [check name]

Step 4: Provide Remediation

For each finding, output:

Specific config change needed

Example configuration

Command to apply (if safe)

Report Template

═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
🔒 CLAWDBOT SECURITY AUDIT
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Timestamp: $(date -Iseconds)
┌─ SUMMARY ───────────────────────────────────────────────
│ 🔴 Critical:  $CRITICAL_COUNT
│ 🟠 High:      $HIGH_COUNT
│ 🟡 Medium:    $MEDIUM_COUNT
│ ✅ Passed:    $PASSED_COUNT
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
┌─ FINDINGS ──────────────────────────────────────────────
│ 🔴 [CRITICAL] $VULN_NAME
│    Finding: $DESCRIPTION
│    → Fix: $REMEDIATION
│
│ 🟠 [HIGH] $VULN_NAME
│    ...
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
This audit was performed by Clawdbot's self-security framework.
No changes were made to your configuration.

Extending the Skill

To add new security checks:

1. Identify the vulnerability - What misconfiguration creates risk? 2. Determine detection method - What config key or system state reveals it? 3. Define the baseline - What is the secure configuration? 4. Write detection logic - Shell commands or file parsing 5. Document remediation - Specific steps to fix 6. Assign severity - Critical, High, Medium, Low

Example: Adding SSH Hardening Check

## 14. SSH Agent Forwarding 🟡 Medium
What to check: Is SSH_AUTH_SOCK exposed to containers?
Detection:

bash env | grep SSH_AUTH_SOCK

Vulnerability: Container escape via SSH agent hijacking.
Severity: Medium

Security Assessment Questions

When auditing, ask:

1. Exposure: What network interfaces can reach Clawdbot? 2. Authentication: What verification does each access point require? 3. Isolation: What boundaries exist between Clawdbot and the host? 4. Trust: What content sources are considered "trusted"? 5. Auditability: What evidence exists of Clawdbot's actions? 6. Least Privilege: Does Clawdbot have only necessary permissions?

Principles Applied

Zero modification - This skill only reads; never changes configuration

Defense in depth - Multiple checks catch different attack vectors

Actionable output - Every finding includes a concrete remediation

Extensible design - New checks integrate naturally

References

Official docs: https://docs.clawd.bot/gateway/security

Original framework: ᴅᴀɴɪᴇʟ ᴍɪᴇssʟᴇʀ on X

Repository: https://github.com/TheSethRose/Clawdbot-Security-Check

Report vulnerabilities: security@clawd.bot

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Remember: This skill exists to make Clawdbot self-aware of its security posture. Use it regularly, extend it as needed, and never skip the audit.