Nm Leyline Supply Chain Advisory

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name: supply-chain-advisory description: | 'Supply chain security patterns for dependency management: known-bad version detection, incident response, lockfile auditing, and artifact scanning version: 1.9.4 triggers: - security - supply-chain - dependencies - vulnerability - pypi metadata: {"openclaw": {"homepage": "https://github.com/athola/claude-night-market/tree/master/plugins/leyline", "emoji": "\ud83e\udd9e", "requires": {"config": ["night-market.error-patterns"]}}} source: claude-night-market source_plugin: leyline

---

> Night Market Skill — ported from claude-night-market/leyline. For the full experience with agents, hooks, and commands, install the Claude Code plugin.

Overview

Supply chain attacks bypass traditional code review by compromising upstream dependencies. This skill provides patterns for detecting, preventing, and responding to compromised packages in Python ecosystems.

When To Use

After a supply chain advisory is published

When auditing dependencies for a new or existing project

During incident response for a suspected compromise

When adding the SessionStart hook to a project

When NOT To Use

General CVE triage unrelated to dependency supply chain

Application-level vulnerability scanning (use a SAST tool)

License compliance audits (different concern)

Known-Bad Versions Blocklist

The blocklist lives at ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/known-bad-versions.json. It is consumed by:

1. SessionStart hook — warns per-session when compromised versions detected 2. make supply-chain-scan — CI/local scanning target 3. This skill — manual audit guidance

Blocklist Format

{
  "package_name": [{
    "versions": ["x.y.z"],
    "date": "YYYY-MM-DD",
    "description": "What the attack did",
    "indicators": ["files or patterns to search for"],
    "source": "advisory URL",
    "severity": "critical|high|medium"
  }]
}

Adding a New Entry

1. Add the entry to ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/known-bad-versions.json 2. Add version exclusions (!=x.y.z) to affected pyproject.toml files 3. Document in docs/dependency-audit.md under Supply Chain Incidents 4. Run make supply-chain-scan to verify detection works

Quick Scan Commands

Check all lockfiles on machine for known-bad versions

# Scan uv.lock files for a specific compromised version
grep -r "package_name.*version" --include="uv.lock" /path/to/projects
Search for malicious artifacts
find /path/to/projects -name "suspicious_file.pth" 2>/dev/null
Check installed versions in virtualenvs
find /path/to/projects -path "*/.venv/lib/*/PACKAGE*/METADATA" \
  -exec grep "^Version:" {} +

Verify lockfile hash integrity

uv.lock includes SHA256 hashes for every package. If a package is re-published with different content under the same version, uv sync will fail with a hash mismatch. This is your strongest automatic defense.

Defense Layers

| Layer | Tool | Catches | |-------|------|---------| | Lockfile hashes | uv.lock SHA256 | Tampered re-published versions | | Version exclusions | pyproject.toml != | Known-bad versions on fresh resolve | | SessionStart hook | sanctum hook | Per-session warning for compromised deps | | CI scanning | OSV + Safety | CVE database + advisory matching | | Artifact scanning | make supply-chain-scan | Malicious files (.pth, scripts) |

Limitations

Zero-day supply chain attacks have no prior advisory — lockfile hashes

are the only automatic defense during the attack window

Safety/CVE databases lag behind real-world compromises

OSV provides broader coverage but is still reactive