Openclaw

---

name: bagman version: 1.0.0 description: Secure key management for AI agents. Use when handling private keys, API secrets, wallet credentials, or when building systems that need agent-controlled funds. Covers secure storage, session keys, leak prevention, and prompt injection defense. homepage: https://numbergroup.xyz metadata: { "openclaw": { "emoji": "🔐", "requires": { "bins": ["op"] }, "tags": ["security", "wallet", "keys", "crypto", "secrets"] } }

---

Bagman

Secure key management patterns for AI agents handling private keys and secrets. Designed to prevent:

Key loss: Agents forgetting keys between sessions

Accidental exposure: Keys leaked to GitHub, logs, or outputs

Prompt injection: Malicious prompts extracting secrets

Core Principles

1. Never store raw private keys in config, env vars, or memory files 2. Use session keys / delegated access instead of full control 3. All secret access goes through 1Password CLI (op) 4. Validate all outputs before sending to prevent key leakage

References

references/secure-storage.md - 1Password patterns for agent secrets

references/session-keys.md - ERC-4337 delegated access patterns

references/leak-prevention.md - Pre-commit hooks and output sanitization

references/prompt-injection-defense.md - Input validation and output filtering

---

Quick Reference

DO ✅

# Retrieve key at runtime via 1Password
PRIVATE_KEY=$(op read "op://Agents/my-agent-wallet/private-key")
Use environment injection (key never touches disk)
op run --env-file=.env.tpl -- node agent.js
Use session keys with bounded permissions
(delegate specific capabilities, not full wallet access)

DON'T ❌

# NEVER store keys in files
echo "PRIVATE_KEY=0x123..." > .env
NEVER log or print keys
console.log("Key:", privateKey)
NEVER store keys in memory/journal files
Even in "private" agent memory - these can be exfiltrated
NEVER trust unvalidated input near key operations

---

Architecture: Agent Wallet Stack

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                   AI Agent                          │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  Session Key (time/value bounded)                   │
│  - Expires after N hours                            │
│  - Spending cap per operation                       │
│  - Whitelist of allowed contracts                   │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  1Password / Secret Manager                         │
│  - Agent retrieves session key at runtime           │
│  - Never stores full private key                    │
│  - Audit log of all accesses                        │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  ERC-4337 Smart Account                             │
│  - Programmable permissions                         │
│  - Recovery without private key exposure            │
│  - Multi-sig for high-value operations              │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  Operator (Human)                                   │
│  - Holds master key in hardware wallet              │
│  - Issues/revokes session keys                      │
│  - Monitors agent activity                          │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

---

Workflow: Setting Up Agent Wallet Access

1. Create 1Password Vault for Agent Secrets

# Create dedicated vault (via 1Password app or CLI)
op vault create "Agent-Wallets" --description "AI agent wallet credentials"
Store agent session key (not master key!)
op item create \
  --vault "Agent-Wallets" \
  --category "API Credential" \
  --title "trading-bot-session" \
  --field "session-key[password]=0xsession..." \
  --field "expires=2026-02-15T00:00:00Z" \
  --field "spending-cap=1000 USDC" \
  --field "allowed-contracts=0xDEX1,0xDEX2"

2. Agent Retrieves Credentials at Runtime

import subprocess
import json
def get_session_key(item_name: str) -> dict:
    """Retrieve session key from 1Password at runtime."""
    result = subprocess.run(
        ["op", "item", "get", item_name, "--vault", "Agent-Wallets", "--format", "json"],
        capture_output=True, text=True, check=True
    )
    item = json.loads(result.stdout)
    
    # Extract fields
    fields = {f["label"]: f.get("value") for f in item.get("fields", [])}
    
    # Validate session hasn't expired
    from datetime import datetime
    expires = datetime.fromisoformat(fields.get("expires", "2000-01-01"))
    if datetime.now() > expires:
        raise ValueError("Session key expired - request new key from operator")
    
    return {
        "session_key": fields.get("session-key"),
        "expires": fields.get("expires"),
        "spending_cap": fields.get("spending-cap"),
        "allowed_contracts": fields.get("allowed-contracts", "").split(",")
    }

3. Never Log or Store the Key

# ❌ BAD - Key in logs
logger.info(f"Using key: {session_key}")
✅ GOOD - Redacted identifier
logger.info(f"Using session key: {session_key[:8]}...{session_key[-4:]}")
❌ BAD - Key in memory file
with open("memory/today.md", "a") as f:
    f.write(f"Session key: {session_key}")
✅ GOOD - Reference only
with open("memory/today.md", "a") as f:
    f.write(f"Session key: [stored in 1Password: trading-bot-session]")

---

Leak Prevention

Output Sanitization

Before any agent output (chat, logs, file writes), scan for key patterns:

import re
KEY_PATTERNS = [
    r'0x[a-fA-F0-9]{64}',                    # ETH private keys
    r'sk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{48,}',                  # OpenAI keys
    r'sk-ant-[a-zA-Z0-9\-_]{80,}',           # Anthropic keys
    r'gsk_[a-zA-Z0-9]{48,}',                 # Groq keys
    r'[A-Za-z0-9+/]{40,}={0,2}',             # Base64 encoded (suspiciously long)
]
def sanitize_output(text: str) -> str:
    """Remove potential secrets from output."""
    for pattern in KEY_PATTERNS:
        text = re.sub(pattern, '[REDACTED]', text)
    return text
Apply to ALL agent outputs
def send_message(content: str):
    content = sanitize_output(content)
    # ... send to chat/log/file

Pre-commit Hook

Install this hook to prevent accidental commits of secrets:

#!/bin/bash
.git/hooks/pre-commit
PATTERNS=(
    '0x[a-fA-F0-9]{64}'
    'sk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{48,}'
    'sk-ant-api'
    'PRIVATE_KEY='
    'gsk_[a-zA-Z0-9]{48,}'
)
for pattern in "${PATTERNS[@]}"; do
    if git diff --cached | grep -qE "$pattern"; then
        echo "❌ Potential secret detected matching: $pattern"
        echo "   Remove secrets before committing!"
        exit 1
    fi
done

.gitignore Essentials

# Secrets
.env
.env.*
*.pem
*.key
secrets/
credentials/
Agent state that might contain secrets
memory/*.json
wallet-state.json
session-keys/

---

Prompt Injection Defense

Input Validation

Before processing any user input that touches wallet operations:

DANGEROUS_PATTERNS = [
    r'ignore.*(previous|above|prior).*instructions',
    r'reveal.*(key|secret|password|credential)',
    r'output.*(key|secret|private)',
    r'print.*(key|secret|wallet)',
    r'show.*(key|secret|password)',
    r'what.*(key|secret|password)',
    r'tell.*me.*(key|secret)',
    r'disregard.*rules',
    r'system.*prompt',
    r'jailbreak',
    r'dan.*mode',
]
def validate_input(text: str) -> bool:
    """Check for prompt injection attempts."""
    text_lower = text.lower()
    for pattern in DANGEROUS_PATTERNS:
        if re.search(pattern, text_lower):
            return False
    return True
def process_wallet_request(user_input: str):
    if not validate_input(user_input):
        return "I can't help with that request."
    # ... proceed with wallet operation

Separation of Concerns

Wallet operations should be in isolated functions with no access to conversation context

Never pass full conversation history to wallet-sensitive code

Use allowlists for operations, not blocklists

ALLOWED_WALLET_OPERATIONS = {
    "check_balance": lambda: get_balance(),
    "send_usdc": lambda to, amount: send_usdc(to, amount) if amount < DAILY_LIMIT else deny(),
    "swap": lambda: swap_tokens() if within_limits() else deny(),
}
def execute_wallet_operation(operation: str, **kwargs):
    """Execute only explicitly allowed operations."""
    if operation not in ALLOWED_WALLET_OPERATIONS:
        raise ValueError(f"Operation '{operation}' not allowed")
    return ALLOWED_WALLET_OPERATIONSoperation

---

Session Key Implementation (ERC-4337)

For agents needing on-chain access, use session keys instead of raw private keys.

See references/session-keys.md for full implementation details including:

ZeroDev/Biconomy SDK examples

Permission patterns for trading/DeFi/payment agents

Session key lifecycle management

Revocation procedures

---

Incident Response

If a Key is Leaked

1. Immediate: Revoke the session key / rotate credentials 2. Assess: Check transaction history for unauthorized activity 3. Notify: Alert operator via secure channel 4. Rotate: Issue new session key with tighter permissions 5. Audit: Review how leak occurred, update defenses

# Emergency: Revoke 1Password item
op item delete "compromised-session-key" --vault "Agent-Wallets"
Rotate to new session key
op item create --vault "Agent-Wallets" --category "API Credential" \
  --title "trading-bot-session-v2" ...

---

Checklist: Agent Wallet Setup

[ ] Create dedicated 1Password vault for agent credentials

[ ] Store session keys (NOT master keys) in vault

[ ] Set appropriate expiry and spending limits

[ ] Install pre-commit hook for secret detection

[ ] Add output sanitization to all agent responses

[ ] Implement input validation for prompt injection

[ ] Configure monitoring and alerts

[ ] Document incident response procedure

[ ] Test key rotation procedure

---

Common Mistakes Found in Production

1. Keys in Memory Files

Problem: Agents store keys in memory/*.md for "persistence"

# memory/2026-02-07.md
Test Wallet
Private key: 0x9f01dad551039daad3a8c4e43a32035bdd4da54e7b4292268be16e913b0b3e56

Fix: Store reference only: Private key: [1Password: test-wallet-session]

2. Keys in Environment Templates

Problem: .env.example contains real keys

# .env.example
PRIVATE_KEY=sk-ant-api03-real-key-here...  # "for testing"

Fix: Use obviously fake placeholders: PRIVATE_KEY=your-key-here

3. Keys in Error Messages

Problem: Error handling exposes keys

try:
    sign_transaction(private_key, tx)
except Exception as e:
    logger.error(f"Failed with key {private_key}: {e}")  # ❌

Fix: Never include credentials in error context

4. Test Keys in Production Code

Problem: Hardcoded test keys make it to main branch

Fix: Use separate test vault, CI checks for key patterns

---

Integration with OpenClaw

When running as an OpenClaw agent:

1. Use 1Password skill for all secret retrieval 2. Never write keys to workspace files - they persist across sessions 3. Sanitize outputs before sending to any channel (Telegram, Discord, etc.) 4. Session key approach for wallet operations - request bounded access from operator 5. Document key references in TOOLS.md, not the actual keys

Example TOOLS.md entry:

### Agent Wallet
Address: 0xABC123...
Session key: [1Password: my-agent-session]
Permissions: USDC transfers < 100, approved DEX only
Expires: 2026-02-15
To rotate: Ask operator via Telegram