Transparency Log Auditor

Input: Audit transparency log coverage for data-pipeline-connector skill

📋 TRANSPARENCY LOG AUDIT
Skill: data-pipeline-connector
Registry: primary-marketplace.example
Audit timestamp: 2025-04-15T11:00:00Z
Log infrastructure:
  Registry transparency log endpoint: ✗ Not found
  Fallback: Registry signing record (internal only)
  Third-party log inclusion: ✗ Not configured
Signing events in internal record:
  v1.0.0: ✅ Signed — key: ed25519:a3f9c2 — timestamp: 2024-11-01
  v1.1.0: ✅ Signed — key: ed25519:a3f9c2 — timestamp: 2024-12-15
  v1.2.0: ✅ Signed — key: ed25519:b7d441 — timestamp: 2025-01-30
Independent verification:
  Can auditor verify v1.0.0 signature without trusting registry? ✗ No
  Can auditor verify key rotation at v1.2.0 without trusting registry? ✗ No
  External log cross-check available? ✗ No
Cross-registry check:
  Mirror registry (backup-marketplace.example): Available
  Mirror signing record for v1.2.0: key ed25519:a3f9c2 (diverges from primary)
  ⚠️ INCONSISTENCY: Primary records key change at v1.2.0; mirror records same key
Coverage verdict: REGISTRY-ONLY
  Signing history exists but is not independently verifiable.
  Cross-registry inconsistency detected at v1.2.0 — one registry's
  history has been altered without a transparency log to detect which.
Risk assessment: HIGH
  Without an independently auditable log, the key rotation at v1.2.0
  cannot be attributed to legitimate key management vs. retroactive
  record alteration. The cross-registry divergence makes this worse:
  at least one registry's signing history is incorrect.
Recommended actions:
  1. Request explanation for cross-registry divergence at v1.2.0
  2. Treat v1.2.0+ as signed by an unverified key pending investigation
  3. Advocate for registry to publish to a public transparency log
  4. Consider pinning to v1.1.0 (last version with consistent records)